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Introduction
"Diaspora" has enjoyed a spectacular career recently in the social sciences and humanities. 1 Yet as the term has proliferated, its meaning has become less and less clear. At a minimum, the term involves some notion of dispersion in space and some reference to an actual or imagined homeland, from which the diaspora has become separated, yet towards which it remains oriented in some way -emotionally, imaginatively, or politically. All diasporas, understood in this way, involve a triadic nexus linking diaspora, homeland, and host country or countries.
2 But this nexus can assume many different forms.
In most contemporary discussions, the term "diaspora", together with kindred terms such as "globalization", "transnationalism", and "identity" (especially when this last is understood as fractured, fragmented, multiple, fluid, and so on) evokes the image of a post-modern, uprooted, mobile, deterritorialized world. It suggests, moreover, a post-national world, a world in which the nation-state is no longer an appropriate category of analysis.
The accidental diasporas I address in this paper belong to a very different world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is often casually included in enumerations of phenomena purporting to show a trend towards the weakening or even the "transcendence" of the nation-state. The reverse is more nearly the case. The Soviet Union was itself an attempt -a failed attempt, but an attempt nonetheless -to "transcend" the nation-state by constructing an expressly multinational state, a state populated by dozens of major -and officially recognized -nationalities. Seen from this perspective, the breakup of the Soviet Union involved a move back to, rather than beyond, the nation-state. The same could be said of the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. diasporas -the ethnic Germans who were scattered across Eastern Europe in the interwar period, and the ethnic Russians who are scattered across Soviet successor states today.
In the burgeoning discussion of diasporas today, Germans and Russians would be among the last groups to spring to mind. In so far as Germany figures at all in the discussion, it is as a host country for labor diasporas, not as a homeland. Germans and Russians exemplify a very different kind of diaspora than that on which recent discussion has focused. They are what I have called in my title "accidental diasporas".
Let me explain what I mean by this term by contrasting accidental diasporas and the more familiar labor diasporas that have been at the center of much recent discussion. First, labor migrant diasporas are constituted by the movement of people across borders, accidental diasporas by the movement of borders across people. Second, migrant diasporas form gradually through countless individual migration trajectories, while accidental d iasporas crystallize suddenly following a dramatic -and often traumatic -reconfiguration of political space. Third, labor migrant diasporas are constituted through the voluntary actions of those who comprise them, while accidental diasporas come into being without the participation, and often against the will, of their members. Fourth, labor migrant diasporas tend to be territorially dispersed, and to lack deep roots in their host countries, while accidental diasporas tend to be more concentrated and territorially rooted. Finally, labor migrant diasporas typically remain for some time citizens of their home countries, while members of accidental diasporas are citizens of the countries in which they live.
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Of course the contrast between labor migrant diasporas and accidental diasporas is not as sharp in reality as I have drawn it here. Some labor migrations generate new forms of territorial concentration in host countries, while some accidental diasporas -or at least some parts of such diasporas -are territorially dispersed. Some labor migrants have acquired citizenship of their host countries, while some members of accidental diasporas -including most Russians and other Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia -have not.
Moreover -and this is a point I want to dwell on for a moment -most accidental diasporas, like labor diasporas, have been shaped to some extent by migration. But the migration in question occurred long ago. The German Drang nach Osten, for example, began in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as peasant settlements spread eastward beyond the zone of 4 There are obviously other kinds of diasporas than the two forms I've contrasted here. Besides the archetypal Jewish diaspora one might mention the classical trading diasporas and their modern-day successors, sometimes known as middleman minorities (Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Middleman Minorities", American Sociological Review 38 [1973] , 583-594); the "mobilized diasporas" conceptualized by John Armstrong ("Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas", American Political Science Review 70 [1970] ); and the diasporas constituted by the slave trade and by other forms of unfree labor within colonial empires. And of course many other distinctions could be drawn. I have focused on one particular contrast -and have drawn the contrast as sharply as possible -in order to highlight the distinctiveness of the diasporas I address in this paper.
consolidated German settlement, creating a pattern of mixed settlement in the German-Slav borderlands that was to last until the middle of the twentieth century. Later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, German colonists were invited to settle in many areas of the Habsburg and Russian empires -notably in Hungary, Transylvania, parts of the former Yugoslavia, and the Volga region of Russia. But even the last of these colonists had been settled for a century and a half by the time their world was turned upside down by the collapse of the great multinational empires. Needless to say, they did not see themselves as "immigrants".
Russians, too, had been moving outward for centuries -mainly eastward and southwardfrom the original core area of Russian settlement in what is today northwestern Russia. This migration, to be sure, continued under the Soviet regime, and was in part sponsored by the regime.
5 So some of those who found themselves abruptly transformed, by the collapse of the Soviet state, from privileged citizens of a great power into precariously situated minorities in precariously existing states had themselves migrated from Russia to one of the nonRussian republics. Yet most belonged to families that had settled permanently -or what they thought was permanently -in the non-Russian republics; in many cases their families had resided there over several generations. And even those who had themselves migrated from Soviet core to periphery had not crossed state borders; rather, they had moved within the territory of the Soviet state. This migration was not only legally and politically defined as internal migration, but was psychologically experienced as such. As a result, these migrants too did not think of themselves as "immigrants".
Thus both Germans and Russians were involved in long and gradual processes of outward dispersion from original core areas of settlement. But unlike labor migrant diasporas, they crystallized as diasporas through the sudden, traumatic movement of borders across people as multinational empires shattered into would-be nation-states.
This radical redrawing of the political map, at the beginning of the "short twentieth century" 6 and again at its end, was intended to resolve national conflicts. But as we now know all too well, in both periods it simply reframed and in some cases aggravated such conflicts. The very process of satisfying some national claims generated new ones, largely because almost all of the would-be nation-states that emerged from the rubble of empire contained large and alienated national minorities, many of whom felt themselves to "belong" by ethnocultural nationality, though not by legal citizenship, to a "homeland" state from which they were separated by new -or newly significant -state borders. , 1914 -1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994 Speaking schematically, we can say that the nationalization of previously multinational political space generated three interlocking forms of nationalism -all quite distinct from the state-seeking nationalisms on which the literature on nationalist politics has focused. The first is what I call the "nationalizing" nationalism of newly independent (or newly reconfigured)
states. This involves claims made in the name of a "core nation" or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. The core nation is understood as the legitimate "owner" of the state, and the state is conceived as the state of and for the core nation. Yet despite having "its own" state, the core nation is represented as being in a weak or embattled cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. This is seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence. This putative discrimination, in turn, it is held to justify the "remedial" or "compensatory" project of using state power to promote the specific interests of the core nation. Examples of such nationalizing states include Poland, Romania, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia in the interwar period; and Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Croatia, and of course Serbia today. The third characteristic form of post-multinational nationalism is the minority nationalism of the accidental diasporas themselves. Minority nationalist stances involve a selfunderstanding in specifically "national" rather than merely "ethnic" terms, a demand for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights. This specifically national, rather than merely ethnic, mode of self-understanding, and the political stance that goes along with it, again distinguished "accidental", post-multinational diasporas from the diasporic formations most widely discussed today. Salient examples include Germans in many Eastern European countries in the interwar period and Hungarian and (in a more problematic sense) Russian minorities today.
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There is considerable variation not only between these forms of nationalism but within each form. For example, the explicit, self-conscious nationalizing policies of Estonia differ markedly from the milder and subtler nationalizing policies and practices characteristic of post-independence Ukraine, and from the on declared but in practice strongly nationalizing practices of Kazakhstan; and all of these differ from the violently homogenizing nationalizing policies and practices of Serbia and Croatia. Or, to take another example, the wellorganized, well-financed minority nationalism of Hungarians in Romania today differs markedly from the generally passive, disorganized stance of Russians in most Soviet successor states. Finally, the culturally oriented, carefully modulated homeland nationalism of post-communist Hungary, oriented to Hungarian minorities in neighboring states, differs dramatically from the aggressive, destabilizing homeland nationalism of Serbia in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia. There is of course striking variation on lower levels of aggregation as well -variation, for example, among and even within differently situated Hungarian minority communities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine. And there has been great variation over time in Serbian homeland nationalism, Estonian nationalizing nationalism, and so on. As I've argued elsewhere, these forms of nationalism should not be conceived as fixed forms or as "forces" varying only in intensity, but rather as variably configured, dynamically changing interactive "fields", as arenas of struggle between differentiated and competing "stances".
9 Yet despite this heterogeneity and variation at all levels of aggregation, these three forms of nationalism -nationalizing nationalism, homeland 8
Like homeland nationalisms, minority nationalisms arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalizing nationalisms. But minorities are not necessarily aligned with the external national homelands that claim to speak in their name. Hungarian minority politicians in Romania, for example, protested against the "Basic Treaty" signed in 1996 between Hungary and Romania; while Hungarian officials claimed that the treaty would help protect the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, many minority Hungarians contested this and argued that they were "sold out" by a government unsympathetic to their claims for autonomy and collective rights. However, these other forms of nationalism stand analytically apart from the first three, though they are often intertwined with them in practice. Unlike the first three forms I identified, these additional forms are neither defined in mutual interaction with one another nor directly engendered by the incomplete nationalization of previously multinational political space. For my purposes, the relevant field for comparative analysis is constituted by the dynamically interacting set of nationalizing, homeland, and minority nationalisms.
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I attempt here a comparison across time and space, focusing on transborder homeland nationalisms, the least well explored of these three interlocking forms of nationalism. In the interwar period, the transborder homeland nationalisms of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria collided explosively with the nationalizing nationalisms of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, giving rise to tensions and crises that were closely bound up with the outbreak of the Second World War.
Seemingly analogous collisions threaten the stability and security of the region today. In some cases they have already led to war. The interplay between the nationalizing 10 This field offers rich and largely untapped possibilities for comparative analysis, and one can obviously cut into it analytically in many different ways, at many different levels of aggregation, and using many different strategies of comparative analysis. I present one such cut here, at an extreme macro level of aggregation. In other work in the same broad field, I've been working at lower levels of aggregation, most recently in an ethnographic mode, and at a micro-interactionist level of analysis; so I am certainly not claiming any privileged status for the kind of extreme macro perspective I offer here. 12 My main concern is not with specific differences in outcome -though there are differences in outcome that interest me. It is rather to specify the distinctiveness of the overall configuration of homeland nationalist claims and practices in the interwar period and the present, using Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia as examples. Towards the end of the paper, I make some arguments linking these distinctive configurations to differences in outcome -but I present these as preliminary, speculative lines of interpretation, not as testable propositions. Secondly, the Weimar Republic -its basic territorial and institutional parameters deeply contested and lacking legitimacy -could not claim to adequately "embody" the German nation, and therefore could not "contain" nationalism within the institutional and territorial frame of the state -something that the geopolitically prestigious, "successful" Bismarckian and Wilhelmine state had done remarkably well. In Weimar, the category "nation" was detached from the frame of the week and weekly legitimate state, and again identified with an allegedly robust, state-transcending, ethnocultural nation or Volk.
For a more detailed historical account and references to the literature on which the argument rests, see Nationalism Reframed, Chapter 5. This chapter closely follows the account given there.
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To anticipate: post-Soviet Russia doesn't adequately "contain" "the nation" either -but "nation" is not as central a category as it was in Weimar Germany. Nationhood was strongly institutionalized for non-Russians, but, paradoxically, weakly institutionalized for Russians. This was true in the Czarist Empire, and it remained true in the Soviet Union (the main difference between the two was that non-Russian nationhood and nationality were much more strongly institutionalized in the Soviet Union than in the Czarist Empire.) This lack of strong institutionalization of the category "Russian" may help explain the political passivity of Russians in Soviet successor states so far. In these new circumstances, homeland nationalism flourished in Weimar civil society. Scores of new Deutschtum-or "Germandom"-oriented associations and organizations sprang up, while churches, schools, and other associations organized activities in support of conationals abroad.
Civil society homeland nationalism had already existed, though on a much smaller scale, before the war. What was new in Weimar was continuous, high-level state activity on behalf of transborder Germans. Its core was covert financial support for Germans and German organizations abroad, mainly for schools, newspapers, churches, charitable organizations, social and cultural activities, and economic enterprises. This covert financial support was linked to wider foreign policy aims, but in differentiated fashion, as can be seen by comparing Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two most important "targets" of Weimar homeland nationalism.
In both states, Germans comprised territorially concentrated, borderland minority communities, unexpectedly and unwillingly transformed into national minorities, and considering themselves second-class citizens of 3rd-class states. Yet there were three key differences between these cases.
First, Germans of Western Poland had been citizens of Germany until 1919; Germans of
Bohemia and Moravia had been citizens of the Habsburg Empire, and had never in modern times been united with Reich Germans in a single state. Second, there was a mass exodus of Germans from Western Poland to Germany after the war, but no large migration of Sudeten Germans. Third, Germany harbored territorial claims against Poland but not against Czechoslovakia. Reflecting these contextual differences, Weimar policies towards transborder Germans in these two neighboring states differed sharply.
Towards Germans in Poland, Weimar policies sought above all to curb large-scale resettlement; this was linked to the longer-term strategic aim of sustaining future revisionist claims. After all, if the mass exodus could not be stemmed, and if no Germans remained in the territories ceded to Poland, it would be more difficult to make future claims for border revision.
Toward Germans in Czechoslovakia, Weimar policy was governed neither by any overriding immediate imperatives nor by clear long-term strategic aims. Yet Weimar support for Germans in Czechoslovakia was not wholly innocent of political design. In a number of ways, Weimar Germany used the question of the status of Sudeten Germans to gain diplomatic leverage in pursuit of other foreign policy aims -especially to promote the interprenetration of the German and Czechoslovak economies as part of a broader aspiration for German economic hegemony in East Central Europe and the Balkans.
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The final aspect of Weimar homeland nationalism that I want to signal is that the public side of homeland nationalism was muted -somewhat surprisingly, given the vigor of civil society homeland nationalism and the elaborate program of covert support for German minorities abroad. In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, homeland nationalism has a much higher profile in public discourse -a point I return to below.
At certain political conjunctures, official homeland nationalist rhetoric did become more salient in Weimar Germany. But even after Germany joined the League of Nations -a step it justified in part by arguing that League membership would give Germany an ideal platform from which to defend the rights of German minorities abroad -Foreign Minister Stresemann was quite cautious about pressing issues connected with transborder Germans, and was much more concerned with other, more classically statist aims.
Weimar homeland nationalism can be characterized in summary as a complex web of political stances, cultural idioms, organizational networks, and transborder social relations.
As a political phenomenon, homeland nationalism involved a set of "moves" in both domestic and international political arenas. In the domestic arena, these moves were intertwined with party competition; in the interstate arena, they were bound up with -and generally subordinate to -Germany's efforts to recover sovereignty, revise the Treaty of Versailles, and re-establish its position as a Great Power and regional hegemon. Because of this intertwining, Weimar homeland nationalism cannot be understood solely in terms of its own "internal" logic; it cannot be analyzed as an "autonomous" domain of politics.
As a cultural phenomenon, Weimar homeland nationalism involved the development and widespread use of a set of idioms of identification with, and responsibility for, transborder Germans. These idioms represented transborder Germans as full members of the German national community or Volk. In this discourse, "nation" and "Volk" were detached from the frame of the state and redefined in ethnocultural terms. Externally, this granted membership in the nation to transborder Germans; internally, and more fatefully, it denied membership to German Jews. This new Volk-oriented discourse of nationhood was articulated and propagated by journalists, publicists, scholars, emigrés from transborder German communities, and activists in Germandom-oriented associations and organizations. These idioms were then appropriated and used by politicians and state officials as well, though to a limited extent, in fragmentary fashion, and without the anti-statist implications of consistently Volk-oriented discourse.
As an organizational phenomenon, Weimar homeland nationalism involved a network of state agencies, state-controlled (though nominally private) organizations, and voluntary associations. This network provided an extensive array of organized sites for the development of Germandom-oriented expertise and activities. The leading personnel in these organizations and associations were well connected with one another, partly through overlapping memberships and interlocking directorates, partly through joint participation in a variety of meetings on the affairs of transborder Germans. Together, they constituted an organized "public", a structured, differentiated space of communication, discussion, and debate.
As a social-relational phenomenon, finally, Weimar homeland nationalism involved a dense network of cross-border relations and resource flows. These not only linked transborder Germans to Weimar Germany but, perhaps more importantly, contributed to detaching them from the states in which they lived. This restructuring of social networks and relations was most important in the case of the Sudeten Germans. Their networks and relations had long been framed by the Habsburg state but were substantially restructured after its collapse.
One aspect of this involved the weakening of Sudeten Germans traditional ties with Vienna and the strengthening of ties with Berlin and Germany. This, in turn, encouraged the Sudeten German elite to look to Germany for solutions to their problems rather than to seek to resolve them within the Czechoslovak state.
The vicissitudes of homeland nationalism after the Nazi seizure of power cannot be There are many further parallels between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia that bear at least indirectly on homeland nationalism, including deep economic crisis, a new and fragile democratic regime, and geopolitical and economic preponderance vis-à-vis neighboring states. These parallels are so superficially striking that they have led some journalists and commentators to speak of "Weimar Russia". I want to distance myself from this notion, seductive though it is. My comparison of transborder homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany and contemporary Russia does not rest on a belief that these are fundamentally or deeply similar cases. They are comparable cases in so far as both belong to the broader universe of post-multinational nationalisms that I sketched above. But precisely their comparability permits me to highlight fundamental differences between the cases, and between the broader interwar and contemporary contexts in which they are situated. I want to explore three differences in the forms -and formative contexts -of homeland nationalism in the two settings. The first concerns the greater visibility of official Russian homeland nationalism, the second the weakness of civil society homeland nationalism in Russia, and the third the ambiguity of t he population targeted by Russian homeland nationalism.
Official Weimar homeland nationalism transpired primarily behind the scenes. Our knowledge of it comes mainly from administrative archives, not from the records of public speech. The homeland nationalism of Weimar civil society was public and visible, but that of the state was largely covert.
Russia, by contrast, has been anything but reticent; its official homeland nationalism has been conspicuously visible. There is no doubt an important covert dimension as well, but that's another issue; what I want to underscore here is the public and visible dimension of official Russian homeland nationalism, a dimension largely lacking from official Weimar homeland nationalism. Public pronouncements on the right, and the obligation, to protect Russians in the near abroad have become a staple of official Russian discourse, figuring prominently in accounts of Russian foreign policy priorities.
Demonstrative rhetoric has been complemented by an official, public codification of the "fundamental guidelines" of Russian policy vis-à-vis "compatriots" in the near abroad, outlining a series of thirty-nine governmental measures. Although the Weimar government adopted a number of similar measures, it did not -and could not -admit to maintaining direct contacts with transborder ethnic Germans, funding their organizations, supporting their economic life, or underwriting their German-language press and educational institutions. This suggests two key differences in the international context of homeland nationalism between the interwar period and the present.
The first difference is normative and institutional. The principle of territorial sovereignty was far more robust in the interwar period. Today, the exclusive claims of the nation-state to internal sovereignty have weakened through the growth of a complex web of cross-border jurisdictions in various policy domains, while transborder concern about the rights of minorities -like transborder concern for human rights is widely seen as more legitimate.
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The second salient difference is geopolitical. Russian military, political, and economic preponderance vis-à-vis neighboring states is much greater than that of Weimar Germany vis-à-vis East Central Europe. This enables Russia to adopt an assertive stance on Russian minorities abroad, while at the same time the weakening of models of sovereignty and the new international legitimacy of transborder concerns with minorities enable it to frame its tough talk in newly legitimate idioms of human and minority rights.
This suggests a further contextual difference. Weimar foreign policy consistently, albeit peacefully, sought changes in territorial borders. Russia, on the other hand -perhaps precisely because of its overwhelming dominance in the region -is not necessarily committed to territorial revision. It's true that the present borders of the Russian Federation are universally seen as arbitrary, as lacking any historical sanction or normative dignity; yet they are not universally regarded as in urgent need of revision. Territorial revision is indeed pushed by certain political entrepreneurs, who claim to find intolerable the existence of 16 On international institutionalized legitimacy in the context of an emergent "world polity", see John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the "Authority of the Nation-State", in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987 I think this reflects on the one hand a decline in the "material" significance of territory -a partial "de-territorialization" and economization of power, and, on the other hand, in seeming opposition to this, the institutional reification and "sacralization" of existing territorial frontiers in international discourse and international organizations. 17 The former makes border changes less necessary; the latter makes them more difficult.
By comparison with the interwar period, borders have become more "inviolable", but they have also become more insignificant. This dual development makes territorial revisionism a costly, "inefficient", and, it could be argued, ultimately unnecessary way to augment state power, even for many of those whose agendas are commonly labeled "neo-imperialist".
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On a more speculative note, I suggest there may be a connection between the ubiquitous corruption in post-Soviet Russia and the weakness of classical territorial revisionism.
Because it is so ridden with corruption in every domain and at every level, the Russian state states. It also reflects the fact that civil society homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany could build, ideologically and organizationally, on an established pre-war tradition of concern for Germandom abroad. Needless to say, there was no comparable tradition of concern for Russians outside Russia in the Soviet era.
The last difference concerns the much greater ambiguity of the population targeted by Russian homeland nationalism. Weimar homeland nationalism was addressed unambiguously to persons who were German by ethnocultural nationality but not by citizenship. In practice, to be sure, it was not always evident precisely who belonged to this population, especially in regions (such as Upper Silesia or parts of East Prussia) of fluid ethnocultural identity. In principle, how ever, everyone agreed that German claims as external national homeland concerned the Grenz-und Auslandsdeutsche of Central and Eastern Europe, and that these borderland and foreign Germans were defined by their ethnocultural nationality. 
Conclusion
Weimar homeland nationalism, I suggested above, was a complex web of political stances, cultural idioms, organizational networks, and transborder social relations. Russian homeland nationalism can also be regarded in this way. As a political phenomenon, homeland nationalism has been more salient, in both domestic and interstate contexts, in post-Soviet Russia than in Weimar Germany. Pronouncements on homeland nationalist themes have been more central to both governmental and oppositional political discourse, and to domestic political competition, than was the case in Weimar Germany. Like Weimar homeland nationalism, Russian homeland nationalism is doubly "intertwined" -both with domestic political competition and with efforts to consolidate Russian hegemony in the near abroad. In both domestic and interstate contexts, homeland nationalist stances have been deployed instrumentally, as a calculated means to other ends. But again as in Weimar, this instrumental exploitation of homeland nationalist stances has occurred against the background of taken-for-granted shared understandings concerning the plight of Russians in the near abroad and the obligation of the Russian state to do something on their behalf.
The dual embeddedness of homeland nationalism, as a political phenomenon, in wider domestic and interstate political contexts, means that it lacks its own autonomous logic and dynamic. As a political phenomenon, homeland nationalism is a set of moves, a set of stances, a family of related discursive claims -but the "game" in which these moves are activated, in which they pay off, or fail to pay off, is not any autonomous game of homeland politics, but rather the wider domestic and interstate "games". The "value" or appropriateness of a homeland stance or move depends on the rules of the game and the resources possessed by competing players. In general, the greater international legitimacy and institutionalization of cross-border concern with minorities makes homeland nationalist "moves" -claims to support transborder minorities -more appropriate and useful as political "moves" than they were in the interwar period.
As a cultural idiom, Russian homeland nationalism has been much more uncertain, ambiguous, and fluctuating than its Weimar counterpart. Weimar homeland nationalist discourse could build on the grossdeutsch, pre-unification tradition of the mid-nineteenth century and on the tradition of concern for Germans in the Habsburg and Romanov territories that developed in the late Bismarckian and Wilhelmine eras. Because of the lack of a comparable tradition in Russia, homeland nationalist discourse has had to be assembled by "bricolage" from various available and legitimate cultural "scraps". Lacking indigenous roots, it has had to b e cobbled together from a variety of discursive traditions: from "classical" homeland nationalism, from the legal rhetoric of diplomatic protection of citizens in other states, from human rights discourse, from the vocabulary of great power politics, from the rhetoric of post-imperial responsibility. As a result, the discourse has been multivocal and opportunistic, playing on multiple registers, and lacking consistency. The ambiguous and partly incongruous vocabulary for identifying the targets of homeland nationalist claims is but one indicator of this.
As an organizational phenomenon, Russian homeland nationalism lacks the strong associational base in civil society that characterized Weimar homeland nationalism; the network of organizations concerned with Russians in the near abroad is therefore much more state-centered.
As a social-relational phenomenon, finally, Russian homeland nationalism, like its Weimar counterpart, involves the cultivation and maintenance of cross-border relations and the provision of a flow of cross-border resources. The process of organizing resource flows and reconstituting networks and relations disrupted by the breakup of the Soviet Union is still incipient; and too little is known at present to make substantive claims about it. In the long run, however, the political disposition of Russian and Russophone minorities in the successor states -in particular, the degree to which and manner in which they look to Russia for solutions to their problems, rather than work them out within the frame of the successor states -will be significantly shaped by these relations and resource flows, and on the degrees and forms of integration with Russia (and of detachment from successor state contexts) that they generate.
In comparing Weimar Germany and post Soviet Russia, I've at the same time been making a broader comparison between the contexts and forms of homeland nationalism in the interwar period and the post-communist present. I want to come back to this broader comparison in conclusion.
The inter-state system, I think, can "handle" the cross-border claims of homeland nationalism in a manner that simply wasn't available in the interwar period. Then, the model of state sovereignty was much more robust. Precisely for this reason, borders were not sacralized and reified to the extent they are now. Because sovereignty was more absolute, it was more urgent, more compelling, to "get the borders right". Because the principle of cuis regio eius natio was so entrenched, because it was assumed that s tates could do whatever they wanted to nationalize their territories, then it was seen as a more grievous problem if minorities were "misclassified", assigned, as it were, to the "wrong" state. Now, when minorities are seen is being in "the wrong state", this usually means the wrong status, the wrong condition, not the wrong side of the territorial border. 
